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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 In this appeal, the City of Philadelphia and its 
responsible officials (jointly City or Philadelphia) appeal from 
the order of the district court dated February 16, 1994 denying 
reconsideration of a $125,000 contempt fine imposed on them on 
June 16, 1993.  That fine was levied because the City defendants 
failed to comply with the court's earlier order requiring the 
City to maintain a 90 percent occupancy rate in a residential 
drug treatment facility.   
 The City and plaintiffs in this case, a class of 
inmates in the Philadelphia prison system who filed suit in 1982 
claiming unconstitutional conditions of confinement, entered into 
a consent decree in 1986 (1986 Consent Decree).  That decree was 
partially superseded by a stipulation and agreement approved by 
  
the district court in 1991 (1991 Consent Decree), see Harris v. 
Reeves, 761 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Pa. 1991), under which the City 
was obliged to provide a 250-bed substance abuse and treatment 
facility.  This particular appeal arises out of that undertaking.  
 Today we also file two other opinions disposing of 
several related appeals by the City.  The most detailed 
recapitulation of the underlying facts appears in Harris v. City 
of Philadelphia, Nos. 93-1997, 93-2116, & 93-2117 (3d Cir. 
_______, 1995) (Harris V), an appeal from the imposition of 
stipulated penalties in the amount of $584,000 and the dismissal 
of the City's Motion to Modify the Consent Decree as a penalty 
for the City's lengthy delay in submitting a Facilities Audit and 
Ten-Year Plan.  We file as well an opinion in Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 93-1988 (3d Cir. ________, 1995) (Harris VII) 
(an appeal from the adjudication of contempt and imposition of 
fines arising out of designation of bailable pretrial detainees 
for release).  An earlier opinion was filed from a related appeal 
argued the same day.  See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 
840 (3d Cir. 1994) (Harris IV).  This opinion will set forth only 
those facts necessary to decide the issues presented in this 
appeal. 
 I. 
 Facts and Procedural History 
 Paragraph 16 of the 1991 Consent Decree provides, in 
relevant part: 
 Not later than April 3, 1991, defendants shall contract 
for and provide a minimum of 250 beds in a program or 
programs that provide alcohol and substance abuse 
  
rehabilitation, training and other support services. . 
. .  The beds and services provided pursuant to this 
Paragraph 16 shall be reserved for persons who would 
otherwise be committed to or retained in the custody of 
the Philadelphia Prisons.  Defendants shall have 
discretion in selecting the program provider(s), but 
may not reduce or discontinue the provision of such 
programs without Court approval. 
App. at 115-16.   
 It was understood that this program for alcohol and 
substance abuse rehabilitation was designed for 250 persons 
already in or sentenced to the Philadelphia prison system as an 
alternative to incarceration in existing facilities.  To comply 
with paragraph 16, the City contracted with the Greater 
Philadelphia Center for Community Corrections (GPCCC) to provide 
the required 250 beds in a single facility.1 
 However, by June 13, 1991, the GPCCC facility was still 
not operational because necessary renovations had not been 
completed.  At a status hearing on that date, the district court 
announced its intention to enter an order "that the 250 beds be 
available by June 30th.  And that the City be fined for any day 
that the beds are available and it's not filled to 90 percent of 
capacity."  Supp. App. at 969.  Significantly, the City 
Solicitor, who was present, did not object to the proposed order 
but merely requested that the proposed date be extended.  The 
relevant colloquy was as follows: 
 
                     
 
   1 The GPCCC facility has since changed its name to the John 
Czmar Treatment Center.  For convenience, we will continue to 
refer to it as the GPCCC facility. 
  
 MS. LILLIE: [W]e could get to capacity in about 30 
days, to 90 percent. 
 
 THE COURT: Good. 
 
 MS. LILLIE: And I would respectfully request that 
the point at which you are going to 
impose fines would be 30 days beyond 
today as opposed to June 30th. 
  
 *  *  * 
 
 THE COURT: -- all right. . . . 
 
 MS. LILLIE: Thank you, your Honor. 
 
Supp. App. at 974. 
   As a result, on July 2, 1991 the district court 
entered an order which provided, in relevant part: 
 The 250 treatment beds that the City agreed to provide 
by April 3, 1991, pursuant to Paragraph 16 . . ., shall 
be available and the facility filled to at least 90% 
(225 residents) of capacity by July 15, 1991. 
App. at 199 (referred to as the July 2, 1991 Order).  The order 
also provided that the City must pay a fine of $500.00 per day 
for every day after July 15, 1991 that 250 beds were not 
available or at least 90 percent occupied.  App. at 199-200.  The 
City neither objected to nor appealed from the district court's 
July 2, 1991 Order. 
 On October 10, 1991, following a hearing, the district 
court held the City in contempt, imposing $44,000 in fines for 
the City's "continued failure" to fill the GPCCC facility to 90 
percent of capacity.  App. at 201.  The City paid the fines and 
did not appeal that order.  On the same day, the district court 
  
vacated the July 2, 1991 Order to a date certain2 and suspended 
further accrual of fines until November 25, 1991 to allow the 
parties to develop a protocol for sending eligible inmates to the 
GPCCC facility at the time of sentencing.  Because the protocol 
had not been completed as planned, the question of further fines 
did not arise at the November 25, 1991 hearing. 
 In the following months, the GPCCC facility population 
fluctuated but it was never again 225 after April 15, 1992.  
Supp. App. at 624 (Fortieth Report of Special Master).  The 
special master repeatedly found that the City remained out of 
compliance with the July 2, 1991 Order.  On July 17, 1992, after 
reviewing the special master's Thirty-Seventh Report, the 
district court issued a Rule to Show Cause ordering a hearing to 
determine whether the City should be fined an additional $37,000 
for 74 days during which the GPCCC facility was not 90 percent 
occupied.  Supp. App. at 1139.  After the hearing, the court 
deferred until the next scheduled compliance hearing a decision 
on the amount of fines owed by the City, based on the City's 
representation that the GPCCC facility would begin accepting 
pretrial detainees to increase the occupancy level.  Supp. App. 
at 1142 (Order of August 4, 1992). 
 The assignment of pretrial detainees to the GPCCC 
facility failed to raise its population above 225, and on October 
                     
    
2
  The vacation was until further order of the court "but no 
longer than the next status hearing," App. at 202, which was held 
on November 25, 1991.  Such status hearings were held 
periodically. 
  
16, 1992, the district court ordered the special master and an 
independent expert to evaluate the GPCCC program and recommend 
changes to make the program more effective.  During the 
evaluation process, the court again deferred the imposition of 
fines.  Supp. App. at 625 (Fortieth Report of Special Master).  
Meanwhile, conditions at the facility deteriorated to the point 
that the Philadelphia District Attorney refused to request 
assignment of inmates to it and state court judges discontinued 
making such assignments.  See Supp. App. at 625-27 (Fortieth 
Report).   
 As the City acknowledged in its motion for 
reconsideration, there were "repeated reports of drug use, high 
walkaway rates, and acts of violence in the [GPCCC] facility."  
App. at 858.  In addition, residents who violated facility rules 
and tested positive for drug use were discharged without 
sanctions.  App. at 858-59.  As a result, by May 19, 1993, the 
GPCCC facility's population declined to 34.  Supp. App. at 626-27 
(Fortieth Report). 
 By April 1993, the City expressed its intention to 
issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) seeking a facility to replace 
the GPCCC facility, and in May 1993 the City stopped making 
payments to GPCCC.  Supp. App. at 625-26.  As of May 19, 1993, 
the population of the GPCCC facility had been below 90 percent of 
capacity for 399 consecutive days, creating a potential liability 
by the City of $199,500 in fines.  Supp. App. at 627. 
 As a result of the City's continued noncompliance with 
the July 2, 1991 Order, and after a hearing on June 11, 1993, the 
  
district court fined the City $125,000, allowing a credit for 
time during which the special master and independent expert were 
evaluating the facility.  In its order, dated June 16, 1993, the 
district court tolled the further accrual of fines pending 
submission of the RFP by June 30, 1993. 
 The City filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
order imposing the $125,000 fine as a sanction, which the 
district court denied on February 16, 1994.  In its opinion, the 
district court held that the City had waived the opportunity to 
argue that the July 2, 1991 Order exceeded the scope of the 1991 
Consent Decree, and that even if the 1991 Consent Decree did not 
support that order the City had still failed to comply with 
paragraph 16 because the GPCCC facility provided inadequate 
treatment services. 
 The City now appeals from the district court's order 
denying reconsideration.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 
874 F.2d 147, 152 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 
948 (1989); Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 
850, 854 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1050 (1993). 
  
 II. 
 Discussion 
 The City raises four arguments on appeal.  First, it 
argues that the Order of July 2, 1991 imposing the 90 percent 
occupancy requirement exceeded the scope of the Consent Decree.  
Second, it contends that the imposition of contempt sanctions was 
without adequate due process notice or hearing.  Third, the City 
claims that it was impossible for it to comply with the July 2, 
1991 Order because it lacked power to compel state court judges 
to assign inmates to the GPCCC facility.  Finally, the City 
argues that plaintiffs have unclean hands and should be barred 
from any benefit from a contempt sanction. 
 A. 
 According to the City, the district court impermissibly 
expanded the City's obligations beyond the "four corners" of the 
1991 Consent Decree by requiring the City to ensure 90 percent 
occupancy of GPCCC.  Normally, "[f]or the purposes of 
enforcement, a consent judgment is to be interpreted as a 
contract, to which the governing rules of contract interpretation 
apply."  Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 148 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  The obligations imposed by a consent decree must be 
"discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what 
might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it."  United 
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).  As this court 
has said, "[t]he agreement memorializes the bargained for 
positions of the parties and should be strictly construed to 
preserve those . . . positions."  Halderman v. Pennhurst State 
  
Sch. and Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 850 (1990). 
 However, we have no occasion on this appeal to decide 
whether the July 2, 1991 Order exceeded the scope of the 1991 
Consent Decree, because the validity of that order is not open to 
collateral attack in a contempt proceeding for violating it.  See 
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 68 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 
1990); see also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-
21 (1967).  As we have stated, "'[i]f a person to whom a judge 
directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is 
to appeal, but, absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the 
order pending appeal.'"  United States v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839, 
845 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 
(1975)). 
 It is true, as the City notes, that we will review the 
validity of the underlying order in a contempt proceeding when 
the underlying order was not previously appealable and compliance 
would result in irreparable harm.  See United States v. Pearce, 
792 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Maness, 419 U.S. at 460 
and United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971)).  
However, even assuming that compliance would have resulted in 
irreparable harm, that exception is inapplicable here because the 
July 2, 1991 Order was previously appealable as an injunction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  See Harris IV, 35 F.3d at 844 
(asserting appellate jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(1) over 
appeal of orders related to consent decree which imposed 
  
affirmative duties on City); see also Sansom Committee v. Lynn, 
735 F.2d 1552, 1553 (3d Cir.) (order extending a compliance 
deadline in a consent decree by 30 days was "in the nature of a 
preliminary injunction" and appealable under section 1292(a)(1)), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).   
 The City claims that the Order of July 2, 1991 was not 
appealable because it provided that fines would be imposed in the 
future only if certain conditions were not fulfilled.  This 
argument confuses appeal from final orders with appeal from 
injunctions.  Generally, a party may not appeal from an otherwise 
final order awarding damages or fines until the damages or fines 
have been calculated, unless calculation would be a purely 
ministerial act.  See Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 
F.3d 931, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1994).  But the July 2, 1991 Order 
imposed an immediate duty on the City to open the GPCCC facility 
and fill it to 90 percent of capacity by July 15, 1991.  The 
July 2, 1991 order thus satisfied the requirements of section 
1292(a)(1) because it "grant[ed] relief [that] could be enforced 
pendente lite by contempt if necessary."  Cohen v. Board of 
Trustees of Univ. of Medicine, 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(in banc).  It was therefore appealable when entered.3 
                     
    
3
 Because we hold the order was appealable as an 
injunction, we need not decide if it was also appealable as a 
final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see United States v. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 
1987) (order modifying consent decree by indefinitely extending 
compliance deadline appealable as final order). 
  
 The City argues that it is not "incumbent upon [it] to 
file a Notice of Appeal from virtually every interlocutory order 
entered . . . to preserve its rights to appellate review," and 
that it may "wait to see which orders, in the ebb and flow of 
events, actually cause serious prejudice to the City and merit 
the attention of the Court of Appeals."  Reply Brief for City at 
4.   We simply cannot accept the City's argument that it can pick 
and choose when to appeal from the entry of an injunction, an 
argument that ignores the mandatory nature of the time limits for 
filing a notice of appeal.  If a party could obtain appellate 
review of court orders simply by disobeying them at any time, the 
time limits for appeal mandated by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) "would 
easily be set to naught," thus destroying "the finality of 
judgments of both appellate and trial courts."  Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(in banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984); see also United 
States v. Millstone Enterprises, Inc., 864 F.2d 21, 23-24 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  Having failed to challenge the July 2, 1991 Order at 
the first available opportunity, the City may not now attack its 
validity. 
 B. 
 The City next argues that the district court imposed 
the contempt sanction without affording it adequate notice or 
hearing.  Our standard of review over this question of law is 
plenary.  United States v. Barnhart, 980 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 
1992).  See also Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 
F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).   
  
 The fundamental requirements of due process are notice 
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, but the "concept is 
flexible, calling for procedural protection as dictated by the 
particular circumstance."  Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 
1218 (3d Cir. 1985).  In a contempt case, the hearing must 
provide an opportunity to explain why contempt sanctions should 
not be imposed and create a record to facilitate appellate 
review.  Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1127 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 The City raised no due process arguments in the 
district court, either at the June 11, 1993 hearing or in its 
motion for reconsideration.  This court "generally refuses to 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal."  United 
States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 744 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 573 (1993); see also Harris IV, 35 F.3d at 845.  The 
City has put forward no reason why we should disregard our strong 
policy in favor of allowing district courts to decide such issues 
in the first instance when there was no obstacle to their review 
in the district court, and thus the City's waiver of its due 
process argument is a sufficient basis to reject its contention. 
 Alternatively, we hold that the City's notice argument 
fails on its merits.  Having been held in contempt on 
October 10, 1991 for failure to comply with the 90 percent 
occupancy requirement, the City cannot now complain that it was 
unaware that its further failure to comply could be grounds for 
additional contempt sanctions.  Moreover, the district court 
issued a Rule to Show Cause order on July 17, 1992, explicitly 
  
requiring the City to show cause why it should not be held in 
contempt for noncompliance with the July 2, 1991 Order.  In its 
order of August 4, 1992, the district court deferred a 
determination of the amount of fines to be imposed, based on the 
City's prediction that diversion of pretrial detainees to GPCCC 
would satisfy the 90 percent requirement, but the court's 
determination that the City would be fined for its noncompliance 
was not vacated. 
 In the circumstances, we find that the district court 
afforded ample notice to the City.  The October 10, 1991 contempt 
order and the July 17, 1992 Rule to Show Cause notified the City 
that it could be held in contempt, and the August 4, 1992 order 
put the question of the amount of fines on the table at 
subsequent status hearings.  Three weeks before the June 11, 1993 
hearing, the special master's report informed the City that it 
remained out of compliance with the 90 percent requirement.  At 
the hearing itself, the district court told the City that the 
City appeared to be in continuing violation of the July 2, 1991 
Order.  App. at 835. 
 In light of the ample notice previously provided and 
the continuing nature of the City's violation, due process did 
not require the district court to issue a further Rule to Show 
Cause or other formal written notice before holding the City in 
contempt in its order of June 16, 1993.  Cf. American Fletcher 
Mortgage Co. v. Bass, 688 F.2d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 1982) (in civil 
contempt case, oral notice in open court, without written notice 
or service, satisfies due process). 
  
 The City also faults the district court for failing to 
hold an evidentiary hearing before holding it in contempt. At the 
hearing on June 11, 1993, the district court stated its 
inclination to impose fines for noncompliance with the July 2, 
1991 Order, but told the City, "I'll hear anything you want to 
say."  App. at 835.   
 Without seeking to call witnesses or requesting that 
the hearing be postponed until another time, the City then 
proceeded to present its defense to contempt.  That defense 
consisted primarily of the argument that compliance was 
impossible because it could not compel the state courts to 
approve release of inmates to the GPCCC facility, as well as an 
attempt to shift blame to GPCCC for its failure to cooperate with 
the City.  The City noted that it hoped to issue an RFP for 
replacement programs by the end of the month and to have the 
programs in place within 30 to 60 days after that, and it argued 
that "fining the taxpayers of the City of Philadelphia . . . is 
not an appropriate sanction, because what happened here was in 
very large part beyond the ability of the City of Philadelphia to 
address."  App. at 836-37. 
 On this record, we find that the district court 
afforded the City a sufficient hearing before finding it in 
contempt.  The City had ample opportunity to "explain the conduct 
deemed deficient," Newton, 918 F.2d at 1127, and indeed presented 
  
a vigorous defense.  An evidentiary hearing would have added 
nothing of consequence to the record.4   
 The problems at the GPCCC facility that caused the 
District Attorney to stop recommending assignment there and the 
state courts to deny petitions for such assignments are well 
documented.  The City does not dispute that the GPCCC facility's 
population fell below 90 percent of capacity during the relevant 
time period, and effectively concedes that "there were no 
disputed issues of fact related to the July 2, 1991 Order."  
Reply Brief for City at 11.  It argues only that it cannot be 
held liable for "judicial resistance to paroling inmates to the 
facility."  Id.  Because the relevant facts are undisputed, the 
only question remaining is whether those facts justified a 
finding of contempt.  In such a case, no evidentiary hearing is 
necessary.  See Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 
1025 (7th Cir. 1991) (due process does not require evidentiary 
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  In its brief, the City pounces on the statement by the 
district court that "I don't think that this is an appropriate 
time to hear the allegations or decide wherein the merit lies."  
App. at 844.  That statement concerned the separate issue of 
responsibility between the City and its vendor, GPCCC.  
     On June 30, 1993, the district court proceeded to hold 
a limited hearing on GPCCC's claims.  Although the City faults 
the district court for relying on evidence from that hearing, it 
is undisputed that the state judges declined to assign inmates to 
GPCCC because of concern about the program.  GPCCC officials 
testified that "severe underfunding" from the City prevented them 
from providing adequate services.  Addendum to Brief for City at 
A-8.  This testimony was cumulative of similar evidence appearing 
in a City Department of Public Health evaluation of the GPCCC 
facility attached as an exhibit to the City's motion for 
reconsideration.  See App. at 898.   
  
hearing prior to imposition of contempt sanctions where relevant 
facts not in dispute), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992). 
 The district court held that, in the alternative, the 
City could be held in contempt for violating paragraph 16 of the 
1991 Consent Decree, because the GPCCC facility did not provide 
adequate "alcohol and substance abuse rehabilitation, training 
and other support services" as required by paragraph 16.  We need 
not decide whether that determination should have been preceded 
by a hearing notwithstanding the City's concession that the GPCCC 
facility was in "undisputed decline," had "inadequate security," 
was beset with "rampant drug use," and had proved "inadequate."  
See Brief for City at 28, 13, 16.  Instead, we rely on the 
district court's finding that the City was in violation of the 
July 2, 1991 Order, a finding made after according the City its 
full due process rights. 
 C. 
 Turning to the merits, we review a finding of contempt 
for abuse of discretion, reversing only for an error of law or 
clearly erroneous finding of fact.  United States v. Sarbello, 
985 F.2d 716, 727 (3d Cir. 1993).5  The City's defense is limited 
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 The City contends that our standard of review over the 
initial finding of contempt is plenary, citing American Greetings 
Corp. v. Dan Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir. 
1986).  As we explain in Harris v. City of Philadelphia, Nos. 93-
1997, 93-2116, & 93-2117 (3d Cir. ____________, 1995) (slip op. 
at __), American Greetings does not support the City's argument.  
Briefly, in American Greetings, we reversed a finding of contempt 
that was based on a preliminary injunction that did not provide 
sufficient notice of the conduct it prohibited.  See 807 F.2d at 
1147-48.  Whether the notice provided conformed to legal 
requirements is a question of law over which we retain plenary 
review.  American Greetings thus holds only that we exercise 
  
to whether it was possible to comply with the order.  See Wecht, 
874 F.2d at 152.  A finding of contempt must rest on clear and 
convincing evidence.  Robin Woods Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399 
(3d Cir. 1994).  The City may escape contempt by showing that it 
could not possibly comply with the court's order despite making 
all reasonable efforts to do so.  Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, 
Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Ryan, 402 U.S. at 534). 
 The City claims that it has a complete defense to 
contempt because under 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 785 it may not 
transfer pretrial detainees without the consent of the sentencing 
court.  It argues that it must rely on parole petitions to 
individual state courts to fill a drug treatment facility with 
prison inmates, and these courts are now refusing such petitions.  
Therefore, it claims that the district court impermissibly held 
it in contempt as a "hostage" to the actions of third parties 
beyond its control.  See United States v. International Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 899 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant cannot be 
held in contempt for actions of third parties when defendant has 
no legal power to compel them to act otherwise); Newman v. 
Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1528 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant cannot 
be held in contempt for failing to prompt government officials to 
                                                                  
plenary review over conclusions of law underlying a finding of 
contempt, a conclusion entirely consistent with Sarbello.  
Nothing in American Greetings suggests that we exercise plenary 
review over the district court's findings of fact or ultimate 
finding of contempt except to the extent that the finding of 
contempt rests on an erroneous conclusion of law. 
  
correct violation of court order when defendant has no power to 
control actions of officials). 
 Of course, the City cannot directly compel state courts 
to assign inmates to a treatment facility.  But the City's 
undertaking to establish a treatment facility pursuant to the 
1991 Consent Decree imposed on it an obligation to use all 
reasonable efforts to provide a treatment facility to which state 
courts could be expected to assign inmates.  That would 
necessarily be one where residents could not routinely circumvent 
security, use drugs, attack each other in the building, or walk 
away at will.  This obligation includes contracting with an 
appropriate facility, funding it at the level necessary to 
provide adequate security and treatment, and closely monitoring 
performance under the contract. 
 The evidence from the City's own Department of Public 
Health as well as Donald Stoughton, the court's independent 
expert, showed that the GPCCC facility was an inappropriate 
facility from the outset.  According to the Department, GPCCC 
initially told the City it could handle only 125 residents, but 
the City insisted that it take 250, though 250 residents exceeded 
the number that the Department considered appropriate for the 
site.  App. at 885, 895.  Moreover, Stoughton noted the lack of 
"perimeter security" and the "unrestricted and easy access to and 
from the public streets," and concluded that the GPCCC facility 
is "not designed, equipped, staffed or operated as a secure 
detention facility."  App. at 902-03. 
  
 There is also evidence that the City underfunded GPCCC 
and failed to develop performance standards or to monitor GPCCC's 
performance under the contract.  The Department of Public Health 
reported that GPCCC was not funded at a level "in line with other 
residential programs in the area."  App. at 898.  Stoughton found 
a "lack of measurable performance standards and program 
criteria."  App. at 903.  He concluded by stating, "It is 
essential to develop and maintain a performance monitoring 
process to assure that the city is getting what it is paying 
for."  Id.  Finally, both Stoughton and the Department of Public 
Health noted the inadequate number of therapists available and 
questioned whether GPCCC was capable of providing effective 
substance abuse treatment as currently staffed. 
 Because the problems at the GPCCC facility stemmed at 
least partly from the City's own acts and omissions, the City 
cannot demonstrate that it exhausted all reasonable efforts to 
comply with the 90 percent occupancy requirement.  Instead, the 
City helped create the situation leading the state court judges 
to refuse to assign inmates there, and then it failed to explore 
alternative programs until the middle of 1993, when it finally 
issued a new RFP. 
 In such circumstances, the City has no viable defense 
in its argument that it lacked power to compel the assignment of 
inmates.  In Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991), the 
court was confronted with an analogous situation and refused to 
recognize a defense of impossibility.  In that case, the district 
court had directed Michigan prison officials to provide equal 
  
educational opportunities to male and female prison inmates, 
after finding the officials guilty of equal protection 
violations.  On appeal from the district court's contempt order 
and sanctions imposed because defendants had failed to contract 
with local colleges to provide degree programs in women's 
prisons, defendants contended that they were "unable to comply 
with the court's orders . . . because the orders required the 
cooperation of colleges and educators outside their control."  
Id. at 708.  Defendants argued that because the legislature 
failed to appropriate sufficient funds, colleges did not find it 
"financially attractive" to offer degree programs in women's 
prisons.  Id. at 711. 
 The appeals court upheld the finding of contempt 
because the record was "devoid of any evidence" that defendants 
exhausted all reasonable efforts to design degree programs for 
female inmates that would be financially attractive.  Id.  
Defendants neither provided support nor sought funding for 
education of female inmates, though they sought funding for male 
inmates.  Id. 
 Like the Sixth Circuit in Glover, we find the City's 
argument disingenuous.  Because the City directly contributed to 
the state courts' loss of confidence in GPCCC, it cannot now 
complain that its hands were tied by the state courts' refusal to 
cooperate.  We cannot therefore say that the district court 
abused its discretion in holding the City in contempt. 
 D. 
  
 Lastly, the City claims that plaintiffs should not 
benefit from the contempt order because of their unclean hands.  
Specifically, the City argues that by walking away from the GPCCC 
facility, certain inmates have demonstrated sufficient "fraud, 
unconscionability, or bad faith" to bar enforcement of the July 
2, 1991 Order.  See S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 968 
F.2d 371, 377 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992).  Though the district court did 
not address the unclean hands issue, we will resolve it on appeal 
in the interests of judicial economy and because the unclean 
hands doctrine ensures that courts protect "'their own integrity' 
and . . . avoid[] becoming 'the abettor of iniquity.'"  Northeast 
Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1354 (3d Cir.) 
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 598 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
901 (1989). 
 We are most reluctant to allow the misconduct of one or 
more class members to adversely affect the position of a class of 
plaintiffs.6  The members of the plaintiff class who walked away 
from the GPCCC facility will not necessarily benefit from their 
allegedly inequitable conduct by our affirmance of the order at 
issue.  Therefore, even if the isolated acts of certain members 
                     
    
6
 This case is unlike Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959), where we affirmed the 
district court's dismissal of a suit arising out of a proxy 
contest because the plaintiff who had deliberately attempted to 
intimidate stockholders to vote for his election as director 
would have become a director despite his unclean hands if the 
claims of his co-plaintiffs, who were not implicated in his 
conduct, were not also dismissed.  Id. at 882. 
  
of the plaintiff class reflect fraud, unconscionability, or bad 
faith, those acts do not justify denying relief to the plaintiff 
class as a whole, which has not been shown to have acted in bad 
faith. 
 III. 
 Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order of February 16, 1994 denying the City's motion to 
reconsider the order of June 16, 1993 imposing fines of $125,000 
on the City as a sanction for contempt for its violation of the 
district court's order of July 2, 1991, which the City had not 
previously appealed. 
 
                             
